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Abstract
Recent estimates of the global carbon budget, or allowable cumulative CO2 emissions consistent with
a given level of climate warming, have the potential to inform climatemitigation policy discussions
aimed atmaintaining global temperatures below 2 °C. This raises difﬁcult questions, however, about
howbest to share this carbon budget amongst nations in away that both respects the need for aﬁnite
cap on total allowable emissions, and also addresses the fundamental disparities amongst nationswith
respect to their historical and potential future emissions.Here we showhow the contraction and
convergence (C&C) framework can be applied to the division of a global carbon budget among
nations, in amanner that bothmaintains total emissions below a level consistent with 2 °C, and also
adheres to the principle of attaining equal per capita CO2 emissions within the coming decades.We
show further that historical differences in responsibility for climate warming can be quantiﬁed via a
cumulative carbon debt (or credit), which represents the amount bywhich a given country’s historical
emissions have exceeded (or fallen short of) the emissions thatwould have been consistent with their
share of world population over time. This carbon debt/credit calculation enhances the potential utility
of C&C, therefore providing a simplemethod to frame national climatemitigation targets in away
that both accounts for historical responsibility, and also respects the principle of international equity
in determining future emissions allowances.
Introduction
Representatives from around the world will convene
in Paris in 2015 to discuss a binding and universal
agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs)
with the objective of limiting global temperature
change to less than 2 °C above pre-industrial tempera-
tures. Recent research using climate models to esti-
mate the level of emissions consistent with a 2 °C
climate target has led to the idea of a global carbon
budget, which deﬁnes the allowable cumulative emis-
sions of carbon dioxide associated with a given level of
global warming (Collins et al 2013). The global carbon
budget framework follows from the ﬁnding that global
temperature change is linearly related to cumulative
carbon emissions, and is also relatively independent of
the path taken to stabilization (Allen et al 2009,
Matthews et al 2009, Zickfeld et al 2012,Matthews et al
2012). Consequently, it is possible to relate a given
level of global temperature quantitatively to a ﬁnite
amount of cumulative CO2 emissions.
Given the requirement for an absolute limit on
cumulative emissions, it becomes necessary to address
the issue of how to share the effort of emissions reduc-
tions between parties in amanner that is, following the
Copenhagen Accord, ‘consistent with science and
(based on) equity’ (United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change 2009). In general, the lit-
erature pertaining to the allocation of future emissions
can be framed within two extreme cases; at one
extreme, ‘grandfathering’ would allocate future emis-
sions based on current shares of emissions (Neu-
mayer 2000, Caney 2009, Raupach et al 2014); the
other extreme would be an abrupt transition to equal
per capita emissions, in which all regions should be
allocated a carbon budget that is equal their share of
the world population (Neumayer 2000, Caney 2009,
Raupach et al 2014). Between these two extreme cases,
there have been many different proposals for how to
allocate emissions rights in a manner that achieves a
balance of environmental effectiveness, equity,
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economic efﬁciency and technical requirements
(Höhne et al 2003, 2014).
New estimates of the global carbon budget that is
consistent with 2 °C of climate warming (Collins
et al 2013, Friedlingstein et al 2014) open the opportu-
nity to re-examine these frameworks for allocating
future emissions amongst nations, while maintaining
a hard constraint on the total allowable CO2 emissions
over time. An initial analysis of the challenge of shar-
ing a cumulative emissions budget was recently pre-
sented by Raupach et al (2014), who proposed that a
given global carbon budget could be divided amongst
emitters using a generalized ‘sharing index’ which
represents the extent by which future emissions bud-
gets are allocated based on either grandfathering or
equal per capita emissions (Raupach et al 2014). Simi-
lar ideas were explored also by the Deep Decarboniza-
tion Pathways Project, which presented regional and
national carbon budget allocations, albeit in the
energy sector only, and also only for the period from
2015–2050 (Sachs et al 2014).
Here, we extend these analyses by applying a sim-
ple and well-known framework for allocation emis-
sions allowances—contraction and convergence
(C&C) (Meyer 2000)—to the challenge of sharing a
global carbon budget amongst nations, while also
ensuring that the sum of regional allocations remains
equal to the cumulative budget for 2 °C. The C&C
method was developed by the Global Commons Insti-
tute (Meyer 2000), and represents a two-phase process
by which national or regional per capita emissions are
ﬁrst allowed to increase or decrease for some period of
time until they converge to a point of equal per capita
emissions across all regions at a given year. After this
point in time, all countries and regions are entitled to
the same annual per capita emissions (Meyer 2000).
This method has been used to calculate national or
regional emissions allowances for a range of GHG sta-
bilization levels, including CO2-equivalent concentra-
tion levels of 450 ppme, which have been generally
considered to be sufﬁcient to maintain global tem-
peratures below 2 °C (den Elzen and
Höhne 2008, 2010, Höhne et al 2014). These previous
applications have generally focussed, however, on the
calculation of near-term emissions targets, with little
acknowledgement of the need for a ﬁnite cap on total
cumulative emissions over time.
We therefore focus here on allocating a 2 °C
cumulative carbon budget using C&C, as this method
is already widely used, and is also sufﬁciently straight-
forward and transparent to be well understood within
climate policy discussions; the United Kingdom, for
example, currently bases its emissions reductions tar-
gets on the idea of C&C (Committee on Climate
Change 2008). The simplicity of this method has also
received criticism however, and several other alloca-
tion methods have been proposed to allow more ﬂex-
ibility in determining when a given country must
begin its convergence period (Höhne et al 2006), or to
explicitly account for national capacity and income
distributions within countries in the determination of
emissions allowances (Baer et al 2009). These alternate
methods share a common challenge, however, in that
the added complexity and ﬂexibility in determining
individual countries’ mitigation make the schemes
difﬁcult to track, and also do not ensure that the com-
bined individual reduction efforts will respect an abso-
lute global carbon budget.
Another limitation of the C&C framework is that
while it allows for present emissions inequities
amongst nations to be corrected following a timeline
set by the choice of future convergence year, even a
very early convergence year affects only the allocation
of future emissions and therefore addresses only a por-
tion of the equity issue. Many authors stress the need
to also account for inequities associated with historical
emissions when determining what share of the atmo-
spheric commons each region can legitimately claim
(Neumayer 2000, Caney 2009). This idea of account-
ing for historical responsibility when setting future
emissions targets has also been put forward by the Bra-
zilian delegation as part of the negotiations on the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (den Elzen et al 1999).
To address this limitation, we propose here that
historical responsibility can relatively easily be incor-
porated into the C&C framework, using an additional
calculation of historical (and potential future) carbon
debts and credit (Neumayer 2000, Goeminne and Par-
edis 2009). Given that an emission of CO2 can be con-
sidered to have the same effect on global temperature
regardless of when it is produced (Matthews
et al 2009), we can consider a country’s cumulative
emissions over time to represent its net effect on
(CO2-induced) temperature change. These actual
emissions can then be compared to a scenario where
every region’s and every country’s emissions would
have followed a perfect per capita allocation. The accu-
mulated difference over time between actual and
hypothetical equal per capita emissions therefore
represents a country’s carbon debt (in the case of lar-
ger than equal per capita emissions) or credit (in the
case of smaller than equal per capita emissions)
(Neumayer 2000).
In this study, we use the C&C approach to allocate
a cumulative post-2013 carbon budget of 1000 Gt
CO2, which is consistent with the low end of carbon
budget estimates which give a ‘likely’ (67%) chance of
remaining below 2 °C (considering also the additional
warming effect of other GHGs) (Friedlingstein
et al 2014). In combination with this allocation of
future emissions, we also show how the calculation of
cumulative carbon debts and credits allow current,
past and potential future emission inequities to be
quantiﬁed alongside the C&C calculations. Finally, we
assess the current stated national emissions reduction
pledges that have been submitted in anticipation of the
upcoming COP21 meetings in Paris, to evaluate the
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extent to which these targets are consistent with a 2 °C
carbon budget.
Methods
The IPCC’s most recent assessment report (Collins
et al 2013) provided a range of carbon budgets
associated with different levels of certainty of remain-
ing below 2 °C. For example, to ensure a ‘likely’ (67%)
chance of staying below 2 °C, and allowing for
additional for warming from non-CO2 gases, total
CO2 emissions from pre-industrial time until we stop
emitting CO2 altogether must remain below 2900 Gt
CO2. Given that we have already emitted 1970 Gt CO2
up to the year 2013 (including both fossil fuel and
land-use emissions), this leaves a future budget of 930
Gt CO2 from 2014 onwards. This value is also
consistent with the total emissions from 2014 onwards
from the RCP 2.6 scenario (Collins et al 2013). How-
ever, given that current emissions are higher than
those projected for RCP 2.6, a transition from current
emissions to RCP 2.6 emissions at the year 2020,
followed by RCP 2.6 emission until they reach zero,
results in a total carbon budget from 2014 of close to
1000 Gt CO2. We therefore focus on a cumulative
carbon budget of 1000 Gt CO2 for the analysis
presented here, which reﬂects future RCP 2.6 emis-
sions, and is also generally consistent with a likely
change of staying below 2 °C.
For the simplest possible future emissions sce-
nario, we ﬁrst assumed that this 1000 Gt CO2 is emit-
ted via a scenario that decreases linearly from year-
2013 emissions of 36 Gt CO2 to zero at the year 2070.
To better reﬂect an actual world emissions scenario,
we also used RCP 2.6 emissions between 2020 and the
point at which they reach zero (which again represents
a global carbon budget after 2013 of 1000 Gt CO2). To
determine the point of convergence of per capita emis-
sions for each scenario, we calculated the global and
per capita CO2 emissions at the convergence year
(2035 or 2050), using theWorld population prospects
data from the United Nations’ Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs (Department of Economic
and Social Affairs 2013). Next, we constructed C&C-
compatible emissions reduction trajectories for differ-
ent countries and regions, assuming a linear transition
from a given country or region’s fractional share of
2013 global emissions, to the fraction of emissions that
is consistent with equal per capita emissions at the
convergence year. From the year of convergence
onwards, each region’s share of world CO2 emissions
remained equal to its share of world population. We
then used the resulting time series of the fractional
emissions shares to calculate the cumulative allowable
emissions for each country and region from 2014 until
the year of zero emissions.
We calculated historical carbon debts and credits
beginning in 1990, which is commonly cited as the
year in which the scientiﬁc basis of anthropogenic cli-
mate change was sufﬁciently well established as to be
able to justiﬁably hold polluters responsible for their
actions (Vanderheiden 2008, Caney 2009). Following
the approach of Neumayer (2000) and Goeminne and

































Here, a country whose share of global emissions have
exceeded their share of world population will accrue a
carbon debt owed to countries whose emissions share
has remained smaller than their share of world
population over time. We applied this calculation to
the historical period (1990–2013) as well as to future
emissions scenarios, given that these carbon debts and
credits will continue to accrue for as long as national
emissions remain different from a benchmark of equal
per capita emissions among countries.
In all calculations, we have adopted the regional
classiﬁcation from the Global Carbon Project 2014 (Le
Quere et al 2014), in addition to individual countries
selected based on the list of the top ten contributors to
global temperature change identiﬁed inMatthews et al
(2014) (United States, China, Russia, Brazil, India,
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Indonesia and
Canada). In order to harmonize CDIAC’s carbon
emissions data with the UN’s population data, we
grouped Central and South America into a single cate-
gory (‘Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean’). We
considered Mexico to be part of North America
(represented by the ‘Rest of North America’ category),
following CDIAC’s methodology. Finally, we assumed
that bunker fuel emissions decrease proportionally
withworld emissions.
Results
Regional and national carbon budgets
Figure 1 shows our regional allocation of 1000 Gt CO2
with per capita convergence at the year 2035, for the
linear decrease scenario (left panels) and the RCP 2.6
scenario (right panels). As expected, developed coun-
tries with high present-day per capita emissions see a
dramatic decrease in their annual allowable emissions.
This pattern holds also for China, whose per capita
emissions are currently higher than the global average.
By contrast, India, Brazil and Indonesia maintain
near-constant per capita emissions throughout the
convergence phase, whereas much less developed
regions such as Africa show large increases in their
share of world emissions. While not identical, these
two scenarios result in very similar overall carbon
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budgets allocated to each region, given that the
cumulative emissions are the same in each case, and
that a linear emissions decrease from current emis-
sions to zero around the year 2070 is a reasonable
approximation of the RCP 2.6 emissions scenario.
These regional allocation results are of course
shaped by the choice of convergence year. Selecting an
earlier convergence year would result in a larger share
of the global carbon budget being allocated to regions
of the developing world, whereas a later per capita
convergence point would favor the developed regions
whose per capita emissions are currently very high. To
illustrate this, ﬁgure 2 shows the overall carbon bud-
gets calculated based on the RCP 2.6 emissions sce-
nario for per capita convergence years of 2035 and
2050. On average, shifting from per capita
Figure 1.Regional allocation of cumulative CO2 emissions following a linear emissions decrease to zero (left) and the RCP 2.6 global
emission scenario (right). Per capita convergence occurs at the year 2035, and total cumulative emissions after 2013 are equal to 1000
Gt CO2 for both scenarios.
Figure 2.Comparison of the regional cumulative emissions allocation (values inGtCO2 from2014 onwards) from theRCP 2.6
scenario, for per capita convergence in 2035 and 2050.
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convergence at 2035 to 2050 results in a 15% increase
in the carbon budget for developed countries (includ-
ing China), with a corresponding decrease in the car-
bon budget for less developed countries.
In both of these cases, however, the vast majority
of the post-2013 global carbon budget is emitted dur-
ing the convergence phases (i.e. before per capita
emission equalize); for this particular emissions sce-
nario, by 2035, two thirds of the global carbon budget
of 1000Gt CO2 has been used up, and by 2050, close to
90% of the carbon budget has been emitted. Conse-
quently, historical and current emissions inequalities
remain a predominant characteristic of total national
emissions budgets, even with a relatively ambitious
near-term convergence date. While the C&C
approach is therefore able to set a course for a more
equitable future emissions distribution, it is not realis-
tically able to do so quickly enough to both respect a
2 °C emission budget, and also to allow low-emitting
countries to gain the beneﬁts of CO2-emitting tech-
nologies at a level equivalent to current high emitters.
Cumulative carbon debts and credits
The limited ability of C&C to correct for existing
emissions inequality can potentially be addressed by
calculating carbon debts and credits alongside the
C&C calculations, as a way of quantifying both
historical and potential future emissions inequities
among countries. In ﬁgure 3, we show the cumulative
carbon debts and credits calculated using equation (1),
where we have begun the calculation at the year 1990
following the argument that widespread scientiﬁc
understanding of the global warming is a necessary
pre-condition for the allocation of responsibility
(Caney 2009, Müller et al 2009). At the end of the year
2013, all developed countries carry substantial carbon
debts, ranging here from 3.1 Gt CO2 for France, to
more than 100 Gt CO2 for the United States. By
contrast, developing nations currently hold a carbon
credit, ranging here from 8 Gt CO2 for China, to more
than 75 Gt CO2 for India. In general, these historical
carbon debts and credits grow over time with con-
tinued future emissions, until the point of per capita
convergence. China represents an exception to this
pattern, however: while their current carbon credit
represents historically low per capita emissions, their
recent rapid growth of CO2 emissions means that
current per capita emissions are higher than the global
average. Consequently, their carbon credit is currently
being eroded at a rate of close to 4Gt CO2 per year, and
their historical carbon credit therefore becomes a
carbon debtwithin a few years after 2013.
In principle, these cumulative carbon debts and
credits could be used as a framework around which to
decide to what extent historically high-emitting coun-
tries should compensate those counties whose per
capita emissions have been far below the global aver-
age. The appropriate way to translate these estimated
carbon debts and credits into actual policy is of course
open to discussion (Pickering and Barry 2012). For
Figure 3.Cumulative carbon debts and credits, calculated as the accumulated difference between actual emissions and emissions
calculated on an equal per capita basis, beginning in 1990. Present day (to the end of year 2013) debts and credits (shown in blue)
represent the amount bywhich a given country or region’s CO2 emissions have exceeded or fallen short of their per capita emission
share between 1990 and 2013. Debts and credits continue to accumulate until the point of convergence to equal per capita emissions
(shown here for the 2035 convergence in red, and the 2050 convergence scenario in green, given global emissions following the RCP
2.6 emissions scenario).
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instance, the calculated carbon debts could be trans-
ferred from debtor countries carbon budget shares to
the shares of countries’ that currently hold a carbon
credit (and then possibly sold back as credits on inter-
national carbon markets). Alternately these debts
could be monetized using an international carbon
market price or another measure such as the US.
Environmental Protection Agency’s ‘social cost of car-
bon’ (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon 2013), and ultimately transferred to credit
countries or incorporated into the United Nations
Green Climate Fund to ﬁnance projects related to cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation in developing
countries.
Regardless of how these carbon debts are treated, it
is important to emphasize here that fully accounting
for both past and future inequalities requires that any
monetization of carbon debts occur in addition to the
emissions reductions already required by the global
carbon budget and C&C framework. In the extreme
case of the United States, this would entail both: (1) at
least a 90% reduction in emissions by 2050, relative to
2005; and (2) an additional accounting for the more
than 150 Gt CO2 carbon debt that will have accrued
against the United States by that time. And neither of
these conditions are trivial. The US EPA’s own esti-
mates of the social cost of carbon range vary widely,
from $11 to almost $100 per tonne of CO2 emitted,
based on various assumptions of the future cost and
discount rate of climate damages associatedwith emis-
sions (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon 2013). Even at the very lowest end of this cost
range, the United States’ current cumulative carbon
debt of 100 Gt CO2 is valued at more than a trillion
dollars.
Comparison to current national emission pledges
The carbon budgets calculated here represent the total
allowable emissions from 2014 onwards for each
country or region, based on the criteria that: (1) the
global emissions must be constrained to a given total
quantity that is consistent with 2 °C of global warming,
and (2) regional emissions must converge to equal per
capita values by some year.While the climate response
to these emissions does not depend on the emissions
pathway (Zickfeld et al 2012), the particular pathway
of emissions shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2 within a given
country or region does reﬂect both the global emission
scenario, as well as the choice of convergence year. In
principle, a country’s carbon budget, calculated
following the above criteria, could then be emitted
following a different pathway; in this case, the long-
term climate response would be unaffected, and the
principles of C&Cwould also still be respected.
Despite the possible variations in speciﬁc regional
emissions pathways, it is nevertheless interesting to
assess what these regional and national carbon budgets
would require in terms of annual emissions targets.
Figure 4 shows the changes in emissions at 2030 and
2050 for each region following the RCP 2.6 scenario,
relative to both year 1990 (left panel) and year 2005
(right panel) emission levels. Global emissions in this
scenario at 2030 are 17% above 1990 level, and 12%
below 2005 levels, and at 2050 are 48 and 61% below
1990 and 2005 levels, respectively (shown as the
‘World Average’ in ﬁgure 4). For most developed
nations, however, per capita convergence at 2035
would require 2030 emissions to decrease by more
than 50% relative to either 1990 or 2005 levels (dark
blue bars). In this case, the largest reductions would be
required by the United States and Canada, both of
which would need to cut emissions by 70% by 2030,
while China’s reduction target in this case would be
16% below 2005 levels. Per capita convergence at 2050
would allow smaller emissions reductions at 2030
(light blue bars) for developed nations (given that
their total carbon budget is larger). However, by the
year 2050 (red bars), the emissions reductions are
unaffected by the choice of convergence year, with
emissions reductions relative to 2005 ranging across
developed nations from 92% (United States) to 78%
(France). Here, China’s 2050 emission reduction is
also comparable to those of the developed nations
(72% reduction, relative to 2005).
Finally, we can compare these numbers explicitly
to stated national emissions pledges, and assess how
these pledges relate to the national carbon budgets cal-
culated above. As of June 2015, only a handful of
countries have formally submitted their ‘Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions’ to the
UNFCCC (available at http://unfccc.int/submissions/
indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx).
Countries in the EuropeanUnion have committed to a
40% reduction by 2030 relative to 1990 levels, Russia
has announced a 25–30% cut by 2030 relative to 1990,
Canada has targeted 30% below 2005 levels by 2030,
and the United States have pledged to decrease emis-
sions by 26–28% by 2025 relative to 2005 levels. In
addition, China has announced that their emissions
will peak by 2030. All of these commitments are clearly
less ambitious than the values plotted in ﬁgure 4; only
France’s required emissions decrease of 46% below
1990 levels is at all close to their stated pledge.
To represent these emissions pledges as a time-ser-
ies of emissions, we have assumed that national emis-
sions transition linearly from current to target
emissions, and in the case of China, that the current
rate of emissions increase will decrease linearly to zero
at the year 2030. The result is shown in ﬁgure 5, where
the colored areas post-2013 (indicated by the vertical
dashed line) represent the cumulative CO2 emissions
that would result if these announced pledges were
achieved. The total amount emitted after 2013 and up
until 2030 (or 2025 in the case of the US pledge) is 368
Gt CO2, which represents 37% of the global cumula-
tive carbon budget for the entire period of time from
2014 onwards. This is a substantial fraction, given the
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small number of countries involved, as well as the lim-
ited time-horizon of the national pledges. More strik-
ing, however, is the comparison of the cumulative
emissions from individual countries’ pledges to the
total national carbon budgets from the RCP 2.6 (2035
convergence) case shown in ﬁgure 2. Russia’s and Chi-
na’s total emissions from 2014–2030 under these pled-
ges exceed their total allotted carbon budget for 2 °C,
and Canada’s emission though 2030 are only slightly
smaller (98%) than their allotted total budget.
Figure 4.Regional and national emissions reductions relative to 1990 (left) and 2005 (right) emission levels, required at 2030 (blue
bars), 2050 (red bars), shownhere for the RCP 2.6 scenariowith per capita convergence at 2035 (dark blue) and 2050 (light blue).
Global average reductions for this scenario are highlighted by the black rectangle.
Figure 5.Comparison of stated national emission pledges (colored areas after 2013, as denoted by the vertical dashed line) to the total
carbon budget consistentwith 2 °C (black line). Total emissions between 2014 and 2030 (2025 in the case of theUS) associatedwith
these pledges are 368GtCO2 (37%of the global carbon budget for 2014-onwards). The percentage of total national carbon budgets
taken up by these pledged national emissions range from60 to 115%as shownnext to theﬁgure legend.
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Emissions to 2025 for the United States, and to 2030
for Europe, represent on the order of 75% of their
respective total budgets (see percentages of total bud-
get given next to the legend in ﬁgure 5). This suggests
strongly that current national emission pledges are not
consistent with the stated 2 °C target.
Discussion and conclusions
The approach we have presented here, using a global
carbon budget as a ﬁnite cap onworld cumulative CO2
emissions, along with C&C as a framework to move
towards emissions equity among nations, offers a
tangible way to allocate future emissions that are
consistent with a likely change of staying below 2 °C.
When combined also with the quantiﬁcation of
cumulative carbon debts and credits, this approach is
also able to account in a straight-forward manner for
historical emissions inequities, and suggests a frame-
work bywhich these historical inequities could be used
to compensate those parts of the world who have
historically contributed less to the climate problem.
Many challenges remain of course in actually
applying this method to climate mitigation decisions.
Scientiﬁcally, we have not accounted here for emis-
sions of other GHGs and aerosols, which have a large
bearing on both historical and eventual future tem-
perature changes. Some authors have recently sug-
gested that GHGs could be usefully separated into two
‘baskets’, in which long-lived gases are treated sepa-
rately in mitigation decisions from short-lived gases
(e.g. Smith et al 2012). Indeed, we would suggest here
that CO2 might usefully be considered to occupy its
own basket, separate from all other short- or long-
lived emissions. Lacking evidence that temperature
change responds linearly to other gas emissions (as is
the case for CO2), it is not clear how to treat non-CO2
gases in a carbon budget framework. The approach
taken in the 2013 IPCC report (Collins et al 2013)
(which we have also followed here) is to estimate the
portion of total warming caused by CO2 emissions
alone, and to estimate the carbon budget consistent
with this level of warming. This suggests that there is
merit to developing mitigation strategies for CO2
alone, where there is robust science to support the car-
bon budget estimates, and to leave open the option of
adjusting these budget estimates over time given the
relative success of mitigating emissions of other non-
CO2 emissions.
There are of course many other allocation meth-
ods that could also be used to generate equitable dis-
tributions of emissions allowances among countries
(Höhne et al 2006, Baer et al 2009, Höhne et al 2014).
While C&C does have its limitations, its simplicity and
transparency make it a very appealing tool to apply to
the already politically complex problem of sharing the
burden of emissions reductions. Previous analyses
have applied C&C to a range of CO2 concentration
targets, including a 450 ppm CO2-equivalent scenario
aimed at stabilizing warming below 2 °C (den Elzen
et al 2003, Höhne et al 2003). These previous studies
did not provide cumulative regional or national car-
bon budgets, and are hence not directly comparable to
the results we have calculated here. We can however
compare the estimates of emission levels at 2050 rela-
tive to 1990 from den Elzen et al (2003) for those
regions that are deﬁned similarly to the regions that we
considered here. Among developed countries, den
Elzen et al estimated emissions decreases at 2050 that
were quite similar to our own estimates, with only
slightly larger decreases for the US and Canada and
slightly smaller decreases for Europe and Russia. For
developing countries, the differences are larger, with
den Elzen et al reporting larger emissions increases at
2050 compared to our calculations. These differences
likely reﬂect different population scenarios (and
would be consistent with higher population growth
projections for developed countries), though are also
affected by the considerably higher late-20th century
emissions in a 450 ppme stabilization scenario com-
pared to the emissions scenarios we used here. The
budgets we have calculated are generally more com-
parable to and consistent with the regional carbon
budgets presented in Raupach et al (2014), though our
explicit use of C&C to generate a time-series of emis-
sions also allows for an explicit comparison of our car-
bon budget results to current national emission
pledges.
Furthermore, the calculation of national carbon
debts and credits offers a new mechanism to correct
for past and current emission inequities, which
addresses one of the primary limitations of C&C, and
adds new overall utility to the C&C allocation
approach. For the historical period, the cumulative
difference between actual and equal per capita emis-
sions up to the year 2013 represents a country’s cur-
rent carbon debt or credit. As shown above, these
debts and credits will continue to accumulate in the
future, regardless of the choice of per capita con-
vergence date, and for as long as inequality in per
capita emissions persists. There is considerable poten-
tial therefore to use C&C to deﬁne national allowable
emissions, and to use the calculation of carbon debts
and credits as a way of quantifying the remaining
inequities among nations with respect to both histor-
ical and future emissions. Additionally, the difference
between emissions that would result from current
national pledges, and the national carbon budgets
consistent with 2 °C could be explicitly quantiﬁed as
an additional carbon debt that would need to be
tracked alongside actual emission reductions. The
resulting carbon debts could then be used to inform
how much high-emitting countries should pay into
mechanisms such as the UN Green Climate Fund to
help support costs of eithermitigation or adaptation in
those countries who have contributed less to historical
climate changes.
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Some authors have argued that even attempting to
allocate a ﬁnite global budget across countries is a
stumbling block in the UNFCCC negotiations and
should be de-emphasized (Sachs et al 2014). However,
from the perspective of the climate system, it remains
the case that the sum of regional and national emis-
sions must remain below a ﬁnite global carbon budget
if a warming target of 2 °C (or any other amount) is to
be respected. The C&C framework that we have
applied here to the cumulative emissions from the
RCP 2.6 scenario is a straight-forward and transparent
method of allocating carbon budgets regionally and
nationally. Combined with a calculation of cumulative
carbon debts and credits, this offers a potential tool to
both allocate future emissions in an equitable manner,
and also provide a mechanism to correct past inequal-
ities in national contributions to global warming.
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